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1 Introduction
Life insurance, in particular whole life insurance plays an important role in German capital
markets. Allianz Leben, the largest German life insurance company, commands assets of DM
118 billion and owns minority shares in several large corporations. Allianz alone generated
life-insurance contributions of about DM 12 billion in 1996 (Allianz, 1996). On the ipside
of the market, 60.5 percent of households own life insurance policies (authors' estimate; see
Table 2 below). Out of total household saving of DM 289.2 billion in 1996, 86.8 billion or 30.0
percent were saved in insurance policies (Deutsche Bundesbank, 1997). Figure 1 shows that
saving through insurance policies accounts for a substantial fraction of the private sector's
total saving, although its relative importance has declined over the 1960{96 period. On
the other hand, the importance of life insurance payments as part of old age income has
increased over that last decades. In 1980, life insurance payments were 10.3 percent of total
social security pensions. This share has increased to 21.5 percent in 1996 (see Figure 2).
Insert Figure 1 about here.
Insert Figure 2 about here.
Who are the owners of life insurance policies? Do richer and more heavily taxed people
hold a disproportionate share of their wealth in life insurance policies? Do people with more
dependents tend to purchase larger life insurance coverage? Answering these questions oers
rst insights into the importance of bequest motives and tax incentives for German life
insurance demand. The latest German Consumer Expenditure Survey, the Einkommens-
und Verbrauchsstichprobe (EVS) { collected in 1993 { presents a unique opportunity to
address these and other issues because it provides information on the cash value of whole life
insurance in combination with socio-economic and demographic variables for the rst time.
In this study, we present empirical results on life-insurance demand using microdata from
the EVS 1993.
1
1
Wahling et al . (1993) investigate the motives for (whole) life insurance demand in Germany using survey
data from 1990 and 1992. They nd that bequest motives and saving for retirement are the two most
important factors in life insurance demand.
1
We motivate our empirical analysis with a stylized three-period model of life-cycle
savings decisions that captures the salient features of the German tax and pension system.
We model life insurance as a combination of term life insurance and a savings plan, and derive
bequests using a \joy-of-giving" motive. This model is in the tradition of Yaari (1965) and
Fischer (1973). Babbel and Ohtsuka (1989) build a three-period model with uncertainty
about future rates of return and health status that allows for simultaneous purchase of term
life insurance and whole life insurance, overcoming the problem that whole life insurance is
usually dominated by a combination of term life insurance and a savings plan. However, their
model is inherently dicult to solve even with sophisticated numerical methods. Moreover,
Babbel and Ohtsuka do neither capture the tax preferences of life insurance nor consider the
eect of public pension programs on life insurance demand.
There are a number of empirical studies of life-insurance demand that are related to
this paper. Bernheim (1991) uses estimates of the demand for life insurance to assess the
strength of bequest motives. In particular, he nds that a signicant fraction of total saving
is motivated by the desire to leave bequests. Browne and Kim (1993) present evidence
on life insurance demand accross 45 countries. They nd that the main determinants of
cross-country variations in the demand for life insurance are the dependency ratio (i. e., the
number of dependents per potential life insurance consumer), national income, government
spending on social security, ination, and the price of insurance. Finally, Brunsbach and
Lang (1998) analyze the rates of return of life insurance contracts generated by the German
tax system. They conclude that the tax incentives aorded life insurance savings in Germany
do not signicantly increase savings.
2
However, while their study carefully quanties the tax
advantage of life insurance saving, it assumes that the cross-sectional data are also capturing
lifetime tax advantages and are thus closely related to the observable life insurance demand.
That assumption could overstate the actual dierences in tax advantages because income
varies over the life cycle.
2
The microdata they use are taken from the 1988 wave of the EVS, the same dataset we use for estimation.
However, this paper uses the more recent 1993 wave; see Section 3.
2
The paper proceeds by discussing some key theoretical predictions from a formal model
of life insurance demand in section 2. The third section discusses the data set and some
preliminary empirical ndings. Section 4 presents some regression results, and the last
section concludes the paper.
2 A life-cycle model with whole life insurance
2.1 The model
A number of papers in the economics literature model the demand for term life insurance.
Term insurance pays a benet if the insured dies before a certain date. The rst model for
term life insurance in a continuous time setting is Yaari (1965). Fischer (1973) develops a
life-cycle model of term life insurance demand in discrete time and discusses the allocation of
insurance purchases over the life cycle. Less common is the modeling of whole life insurance.
In that case, the insurance company covers death for the whole life of the insured and thus
faces a liability for sure at some point. Whole life insurance requires the build-up of insurance
reserves because the insured typically pays premiums only during working life but may die
at a later date. The premiums must therefore also nance the accumulation of reserves
sucient to meet expected later obligations. Many whole life insurance contracts enable
the insured to take out those reserves (the cash value or surrender value) some time before
death, and therefore resemble some combination of term life insurance with a savings plan.
Following the standard approach, this paper derives life insurance demand in a model
with a \joy-of-giving" bequest motive (one exception is Lewis, 1989). The model has three
periods and three types of assets, life insurance, bonds, and public pensions. Life insurance
is modeled as a combination of term life insurance and a savings plan, and the specication
incorporates the salient features of the German tax and pension system.
In the three-period model, the timing convention used is as follows: consumption
streams in the three periods are indexed by 0, 1, and 2, and end-of-period bequests are
indexed by 1, 2, 3, respectively. A consumer can use his income to purchase life insurance
3
L or save an amount S of bonds. Bonds earn a rate of return r and the return is subject
to a capital income tax of 
C
. Moreover, individuals must contribute to a public pension
system with a payroll tax 
S
and they receive pensions in old age. The pension system has
an internal rate of return of g.
More formally, consider the following expected utility function in consumption, c, and
bequests, b:
W (c; b) =
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where  represents the pure rate of time preference,  is the risk aversion parameter of the
constant relative risk aversion utility function,  is the weight on bequests and 
t
is the
probability to survive at the beginning of period t. Since death at the end of period 2 is
certain, 
3
= 0.
To simplify notation, let 1 + r = R, 1 + r(1   
C
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C
, and 1 + g = G. The utility
maximization is then subject to the following budget constraints in the rst two periods
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Here, w stands for labor earnings.  is the exogenous savings portion of the life insurance
contract { if the policy holder survives, a fraction of the insurance sum (the cash value) can
be withdrawn. Note also that in case of death the estate receives the full rate of return on
bonds, implicitly assuming that there are no estate taxes to be paid.
Consumers retire in their third period of life and receive a public pension. Since life
ends with certainty after period 2, there is no role for life insurance in the last period.
Consequently, the budget constraints are as follows:
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The rst order conditions imply the following relationship between consumption in dierent
periods and consumption and bequest for t = 1; 2:
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Bequests at the end of period 2 are simply:
b
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(8)
Using equations (6), (7) and (8), the consumer's maximization problem can be solved re-
cursively. However, the algebraic solution is fairly complicated and therefore provides few
immediate insights (see the Appendix). Instead, we demonstrate the sensitivity of life in-
surance demand with respect to key variables for a couple of numerical examples below. In
general, people buy life insurance for three reasons in our model: rst, life insurance enhances
bequeathable wealth and is therefore valuable especially at younger ages when savings are
still small. Second, life insurance has a tax advantage over other savings. Third, if the con-
sumer considers public pension coverage as too generous he can deannuitize by purchasing
life insurance.
3
2.2 Numerical examples
The driving forces behind the demand for whole life insurance can be most easily indentied
by varying some key parameters of the model. First, life insurance demand and savings are
calculated under baseline assumptions. In particular, assume that each period lasts 20 years
and that the annual interest rate is 3 percent, hence R = 1:81. Moreover, let R
C
= 1:61, in
line with an annual capital income tax of 20 percent. Furthermore, assume an annual pure
rate of time preference of 1 percent ( = 0:22), a rate of return on pension contributions
3
Yaari (1965) discusses why in perfect markets purchasing life insurance is equivalent to purchasing a
negative annuity.
5
of 1 percent (G = 1:22), and a pension contribution rate of 20 percent (
S
= 0:2). Wages
are normalized to 1 in the rst period and 50 percent higher in the second period. We use

1
= 0:95 and 
2
= 0:90, in line with life-table probabilities to live to from age 20 to age
40 and from age 40 to age 60, respectively. The values for the bequest weights, 
t
, are the
average values for ages 20 to 40, 40 to 60, and 60 to 80, respectively, from Fischer (1973),
Table A2. The risk aversion parameter  is set to 2. In addition,  = 0:22, because if people
were not able to surrender their life insurance at the end of the rst period,  = 0:22 would
about generate a cash value equivalent to the insurance value L at the beginning of the last
period of life (period 2).
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Finally, insurance is assumed to be fair, thus Z
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Table 1 exhibits life insurance demand and savings for the initial parameter choice and
a variety of parameter variations. In the baseline characterization, life insurance demand
is strong in the rst period but substantially weaker in the second period. The household
insures 180 percent of its earnings between ages 20 and 40 but only around 37 percent
of second period earnings. Saving other than life insurance is initially negative but turns
positive in periods 1 and 2.
Insert Table 1 about here.
The experiments with  = 0 demonstrate that more than 40 percent of life insurance
demand in the baseline can be attributed to the savings portion of insurance. If  = 0, life
insurance is simply term life insurance as in Fischer (1973). Comparing rows 2 and 3 of
Table 1 shows also that under term life insurance, the capital income tax inuences only the
allocation of consumption over the life cycle but has little immediate eect on life insurance
demand, especially in the rst period of life.
4
An insurer would build reserves sucient to meet the obligations of an insurance contract L
1
that continues
in period 1 (L
1
= L
2
). Thus, people pay a premium in period 0 and period 1 to build reserves sucient
to meet expected payments at the end of period 2, and the insurance company needs to set  = 0:22 =
1
(R
2

1

2
+R
2
)
.  = 0:22 implies that about 19 percent of the insurance premium in period 1 covers the
risk of death, and the remaining 81 percent contribute to the accumulation of reserves. Brunsbach and
Lang (1998) estimate that for a 30-year contract between 10 and 20 percent of the life insurance premium
cover the risk of death.
Once life insurance incorporates a savings plan, taxes can have a quite dramatic eect
on life insurance demand and saving behavior as is revealed by row 4 of Table 1. Without
capital income tax, life insurance is less tax advantaged than under baseline assumptions,
and life insurance demand in the rst period is signicantly smaller.
In row 5, the sensitivity of life insurance demand with respect to the savings portion of
whole life insurance is explored. Brunsbach and Lang (1998) report that many life insurance
holders can expect to receive a distribution of life insurance company prots such that they
can cash out substantially more than the face value of insurance at age 65. An  of 0.28
corresponds to an approximate cash out value of 125 percent of the face value at age 60.
Increasing that value can dramatically shift savings into life insurance: with increasing 
life insurance becomes more of a tax-advantaged savings plan and it is worthwile to hold
negative wealth in bonds while investing heavily in whole life insurance.
Row 6 of Table 1 shows the eect of public pensions on life insurance demand. Because
a smaller portion of resources is annuitized once government pensions are eliminated, it is
more attractive to purchase annuities (buy negative life insurance) and hence life insurance
demand falls quite dramatically in the second period of life. Put dierently, without a
government pension, the consumer must accumulate more savings { indeed the amount of
savings exceeds what the individual would like to bequeath and thus it becomes favorable
to own negative life insurance (purchase annuities). However, consumers also seek to take
advantage of the tax preference for life insurance savings. For that reason, life insurance
demand in the rst period of life falls much less.
The last two rows of Table 1 demonstrate that life insurance { whether life insurance
cum savings or term life insurance { remains quite sensitive to the strength of bequest
motives. The reason is straightforward: with increasing weight on bequests, the consumer
seeks to increase the life insurance coverage in case of early death but also wants to save
more to increase bequests that may occur at later points of the life cycle.
To conclude this section, let us state some qualitative and testable predictions of our
model for life insurance: rst, life insurance demand should rise with the tax advantage of
7
life insurance savings, that is with the wedge between the rate of return on other savings and
savings through life insurance. Moreover, observations of positive life insurance purchases
can coincide with borrowing in the capital market. Second, life insurance demand should be
smaller for people whose public pension is smaller relative to their earnings. Third, whole
life insurance demand is very sensitive to the strength of bequest motives.
5
3 Empirical results from the EVS 1993
This section presents empirical results on life-insurance demand in Germany. The microdata
in this paper are taken from the 1993 wave of the Einkommens- und Verbrauchsstichprobe
(EVS), a dataset that is roughly comparable to the U.S. Consumer Expenditure Survey
(CEX).
6
The data appendix contains details on the construction of all variables used in
our empirical analysis. The sample excludes households headed by foreigners because their
portfolio structure is dierent from that of German households { for reasons that include
dierences in labor market participation, the distribution of human capital and income, and
saving for return migration. These dierences are not the subject of this paper (but might
be of independent interest).
Table 2 contains details of the sample. About 60.5 percent of households hold at least
one life insurance policy, and for slightly more than half of German households, life insurance
is the only signicant form of insurance.
Insert Table 2 about here.
One of the main conclusions from theoretical life-cycle models is that households with
more dependents (children) should purchase larger life insurance coverage if they value be-
quests behavior. In Table 3, life-insurance demand is stratied by the number of children and
wealth. Clearly, households with no dependents dier signicantly from those with one and
5
If we set the weight on bequests to zero, the tax advantaged savings available through whole life insurance
are sucient to generate small positive life insurance demand.
6
Earlier waves of the EVS were conducted in 1978, 1983, and 1988. Note that as a whole, the EVS is not
a panel study but rather consists of repeated cross-sections.
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more children: whereas only about a quarter of households own life-insurance policies in the
former group, the number of policy holders is in excess of three quarters for households with
children. To the extent that higher-income households are subject to higher taxation and
have more children, one would also expect that wealthier people are more likely to have life
insurance. The data conrms that expectation: based on the percentages reported in Table
3, life-insurance demand increases with a household's position in the wealth distribution.
Insert Table 3 about here.
Table 4 displays sample means for key nancial variables. The mean gross labor income
in our sample is roughly DM 63,250, the mean net labor income (after taxes and transfers)
is about DM 46,750. The mean asset balance is about one quarter million DM. Face and
cash values of households' life insurance policies and annual premium payments (computed
for the sub-sample with one or more life insurance policies) are also reported in Table 4.
On average, life insurance cash values represent about 14 percent of assets, and premium
payments comprise about 3.5 percent of gross income on average.
Insert Table 4 about here.
Table 5 exhibits the face values of life insurance policies stratied by the number of the
household head's children and by income quintile. The mean of the life-insurance policies'
face values increases with the number of children, again consistent with the presence of a
bequest motive. Regarding wealth, the face-value means increase with the position in the
wealth distribution, reecting higher lifetime earnings and possibly tax incentives.
Insert Table 5 about here.
Finally, we show age proles for a number of key variables. As with all empirical
evidence reported in this paper, note that as we use just a single cross-section of data, age
and cohort eects cannot be separately identied.
7
Figure 3 shows assets, and Figure 4
shows net labor income for age classes 20 through 85. Older households tend to own less
7
Schnabel (1998) provides evidence on life-cycle asset accumulation based on pseudo-cohorts from four
EVS waves 1978, 1983, 1988, and 1993.
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wealth, a reection of both cohort and life cycle eects. Average labor income in the sample
exhibits a strong life cycle pattern, driven by labor force participation rates and changes in
productivity with age.
Insert Figure 3 about here.
Insert Figure 4 about here.
Age proles for life insurance variables (annual premium payments, and face and cash
values, respectively) are depicted in Figures 5 and 6.
Insert Figure 5 about here.
Insert Figure 6 about here.
The cross section of life insurance premium payments displays a hump shape similar
to income. That hump shape reects the change in income over the life cycle, the increase
in the number of insurance holders between ages 20 and 40, and the tendency to cash out
insurance policies in old age with concomitant lower premium payments. The pattern is also
consistent with life cycle insurance demand as derived from the model in section 2.
Life insurance face values are higher for middle aged than for young people in the 1993
cross section, consistent with the observation that middle aged households are more likely
to hold and insurance policy. Life insurance face values are signicantly lower at higher
ages, again reecting both life cycle and cohort eects. Cash values also are higher at higher
ages, which in this case signies the accumulation of life insurance savings over time. Due to
the design of whole life insurance in Germany, median cash values and face values are quite
similar for people over 60 years of age: most contracts are designed such that the insured can
cash out a balance equivalent to at least the insurance face value at retirement. Therefore,
both the median face value and the median cash value are much lower for people over 65
than for people in their mid-50s, illustrating once again the strong savings component of
whole life insurance in Germany.
10
4 Reduced-form estimation of life-insurance demand
This section presents dierent estimations of life insurance demand functions. The rst
regression is a simple probit where the dependent variable takes the value 1 if the household
holds one or more life insurance policies, and a value of 0 otherwise. The results are contained
in Table 6. The independent variables in the probit are consistent with the determinants of
life insurance demand derived in the theoretical model of Section 2.
8
In particular, the model
includes linear and non-linear terms of age, net labor income and assets to proxy for lifetime
income. Furthermore, marital status and number of children capture bequest motives, and
the average tax rate proxies for the possible tax advantage of life insurance savings. The
model also incorporates indicator variables for civil servants and the self-employed to reect
specic characteristics of the German tax and public pension system: civil servants with
tenure do not have to contribute to their pensions and also receive fairly generous survivor
benets; the self-employed are generally exempt from contributing to the public pension
system but must provide for their own retirement income and survivor's benets.
Because many households cash out their whole life insurance policies at retirement,
many households without life insurance policies are elderly. In order to test whether that
fact has a signicant impact on the regression results, Table 6 presents regression output for
all ages and for a subsample of households with a head of less than 65 years of age.
Insert Table 6 about here.
The results of this simple regression model are generally consistent with the predictions
of the theoretical model presented in Section 2.
9
The likelihood of owning a life insurance
policy depends in a non-linear way on age for both the full sample and the subsample of
households with heads under age 65. The age coecients again capture both life cycle and
cohort eects and imply that people between 40 and 45 are most likely to own a life insurance
8
Chuma (1994) uses a similar set of variables is in an empirical analysis of life-insurance demand in Japan.
9
Recall that \life-insurance demand" here refers to the (conditional) probability that a household has at
least one life-insurance policy.
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policy after controlling for income and other characteristics. Similarly, the probability of
owning a life insurance policy depends in a non-linear way on net income.
Consistent with the existence of a bequest motive, married people and families with
children are more likely to purchase life insurance in both the full sample and the subsample.
Moreover, a higher average tax rate (after controlling for net income and assets) signicantly
raises the likelihood of life insurance ownership, which seems to conrm the theoretical
prediction that tax advantages raise demand for whole life insurance.
Finally, the probit estimation shows that the self-employed have a greater tendency to
purchase life insurance after controlling for assets and income. As pointed out earlier, the
self-employed must nance their own pensions and survivor benets. The tax advantage and
the higher demand for survivor coverage therefore appear to outweigh the higher demand
for pensions (negative demand for life insurance) among the self-employed.
Do the independent variables of the probit regression explain the face value of life
insurance, that is the size of the insurance for those who purchase life insurance? Table 7,
reports the results of an OLS regression of life insurance face values.
Insert Table 7 about here.
West Germans are less likely to own an insurance policy than East Germans (see the
probit regression) but those West Germans who own a policy have about DM 15,000 larger
face values, even after controlling for the income dierences between East and West Germany.
In contrast to the probit regression, where age eects are hump shaped, the age vari-
ables in the OLS regression largely pick up the falling branch of the life insurance face
values (see also Figure 6). Moreover, marital status does not signicantly contribute to ex-
plaining the face value of life insurance. However, the number of children continues to be
(marginally) signicant in the full sample. On average, an additional child raises the face
value by about DM 1,300. Home ownership signicantly lowers the face value of insurance
demand, consistent with theoretical predictions: buying a home oers similar advantages as
whole life insurance, because home owners receive tax preferences and a home constitutes a
bequeathable asset that provides a consumption stream to survivors.
12
The average tax rate is either not signicant (full sample) or has the wrong sign (sub-
sample of non-elderly), and thus there is no direct evidence for increasing face values with
rising tax burden in the OLS regression. However, there is some indirect evidence regarding
the evidence to save for old-age through insurance policies. The indicator variables for the
self-employed and civil servants are strongly signicant. The self employed have on aver-
age life insurance policies that are DM 72,400 larger than those of other Germans, whereas
civil servants on average have policies with DM 10,300 smaller face values. That dierence
can likely be attributed to the fact that the self-employed must save for their own retire-
ment income and provide for their own survivor benets, while the opposite is true for civil
servants.
The regression results reported above implicitly assume that all possible values of life
insurance demand are observable. However, as discussed previously, people who prefer to
annuitize their wealth implicitly demand negative life insurance. Thus, by looking simply
at life insurance demand without correcting for annuity demand, our observations are cen-
sored at zero. In other word, someone who purchases a private pension (buys negative life
insurance) but does not buy life insurance would simply be recorded with a zero demand
although his demand is negative. That problem is particularly relevant for the elderly among
whom many receive public pensions but do not hold any life insurance policies. In order to
overcome the problem of censoring, we run a Tobit regression of life insurance face values
that is reported in Table 8.
Insert Table 8 about here.
Correcting for censoring changes the results of the previous OLS regression quite dra-
matically. The age variables now produce a hump shape with a maximum at about age 35.
Both marital status and the number of children now are signicantly positive, pointing at
considerable bequest motives behind the demand for life insurance. Home ownership con-
tinues to have a signicantly negative inuence on the face value of insurance. Moreover,
the average tax rate variable now exhibits the expected sign and is also highly signicant.
Additionally, the indicator for maximum taxable earnings under the public pension system
13
now has a negative sign and is signicant. That result indicates that { after controlling for
self-employment status { being outside the public pension system or contributing a lower
portion of income than others tends to lower insurance demand (raise the demand for pen-
sion coverage). In other words, as theory would predict, the incentives work in opposite
directions: on the one hand, lower public pension coverage should raise demand for annu-
ities (lower demand for life insurance) as is indicated by the negative coecient of the \large
income" dummy, on the other hand a smaller or non-existent public pension necessitates
higher pension savings and more insurance coverage for survivors, which is how we inter-
pret the large positive coecient of the self-employed. Interestingly, with the exception of
the \West Germany" indicator neither the sign nor the size of the coecient depends on
including the elderly in the sample.
To conclude, the regression results presented in this section are largely consistent with
both a signicant impact of tax incentives and bequest motives on life insurance demand
in Germany. While those eects can be detected in a Probit model of insurance purchases
and a Tobit model of life insurance face values, they are much weaker or non-existent in a
simple OLS model. Given that life insurance face values are censored at zero, however, the
Tobit model seems more appropriate than than OLS. Nonetheless, the Tobit results should be
interpreted with some caution as they rely on the specic assumptions of the Tobit model.
10
5 Conclusions
Whole life insurance plays an important role in household saving. In a stylized model both
bequest motives and tax incentives are driving forces of whole life insurance demand. While a
bequest motive could be satised by term life insurance, sheltering savings from income taxes
is only possible in whole life policies. The empirical evidence presented is consistent with
10
We have restricted our attention to the standard Tobit estimator for censored data in the current version of
this paper, but we wish to stress that there are alternative methods which do not require strong normality
assumptions, e. g., the least absolute deviations estimator by Powell (1984). We are currently working on
a pseudo-panel version of the censored regression model which is based on the trimmed LAD estimator
by Honore (1992), and we plan to apply this model to all four waves of the EVS in future work. (For a
review of these and other methods, see Honore and Kyriazidou (1998).)
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those theoretical predictions. In particular, a Tobit model that corrects for the censoring of
observed life insurance face values nds strong positive eects of marital status, the number
of children and the tax burden on insurance demand.
Future research could probe the importance of bequest motives and tax preferences
further by constructing a time series using all EVS waves currently available. Given the
considerable changes in German tax laws over time (for example, the premium tax rose from
10 to 15 percent between 1989 and 1996) there should be sucient variation to identify the
importance of tax incentives for life insurance demand. Exploiting several waves of the EVS
could also support the separation of life-cycle and cohort eects on insurance demand.
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Technical appendix
The solution for rst period consumption c
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can be derived as follows:
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The solution for c
0
in combination with equations (6), (7) and (8) immediately implies
values for c
1
; c
2
; b
1
; b
2
; b
3
and thus, by applying the budget constraints, also for L
1
and L
2
.
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Data appendix
The Einkommens- und Verbrauchsstichprobe (EVS) is based on a quinquennial survey con-
ducted by the Statistisches Bundesamt, the German Federal Statistical Oce. It is roughly
comparable to the U.S. Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX). The EVS is designed to cover
about 0.3 percent of the household population. It is, however, top-coded: it excludes (ap-
proximately) the top 2 percent of the income distribution (households with a monthly net
income in excess of DM 35,000 are excluded). In 1993, East Germany was covered for the
rst time. We include East German households in our sample, but we exclude households
headed by foreigners. To ensure the sample is representative for the population, we used the
sample weights supplied by the Federal Statistical Oce in all calculations.
Demographic variables All demographic variables are taken from the EVS.
Income Our income variable is disposable labor income, dened as the sum of gross labor
and other non-asset income (e. g., from self employment) less income taxes and social security
contributions plus public transfers plus the net balance of private transfers. Not that our
income measure does not include any asset income (such as interest received, dividends, and
the rental value of owner-occupied houses), as is standard in life-cycle analysis.
Assets The asset variable is the sum of money holdings in accounts, stocks and bonds,
real estate assets, and the cash value of existing insurance policies.
Taxes The tax variable contains the sum of labor and capital income taxes.
Life insurance variables The 1993 wave of the EVS contains gures for total annual
premium payments and both face and cash values of existing life insurance policies. We used
those values to construct our life insurance variables. In addition, thesample contains face
and cash values of some other types of insurance such as insurance for burial costs, insurance
for education expensesof dependents and bridal insurance, and we used the cash values of
these insurance policies in our asset variable, in addition to the cash value of life insurance
policies.
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Table 1: Life insurance demand and savings
Experiment L
1
L
2
S
1
S
2
S
3
Baseline 1.80 0.56 -0.16 0.46 0.65
 = 0; 
C
= 0 0.60 0.13 0.11 0.58 0.72
 = 0 0.65 0.13 0.10 0.56 0.66

C
= 0 0.78 0.18 0.02 0.55 0.72
 = 0:28 6.36 0.86 -1.02 0.38 0.64

S
= 0 1.63 -0.47 0.01 1.09 0.70
double bequest weights 2.37 0.94 -0.20 0.51 0.86
double bequest weights,  = 0 0.86 0.33 0.13 0.65 0.87
Source: authors' calculations.
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Table 2: Sample characteristics
households percent
EVS total 40230
German household head 39612 100.0
West Germany 31173 78.7
No life insurance 15625 39.5
Life insurance only 20253 51.1
Life insurance and other forms of insurance 3734 9.4
Source: Einkommens- und Verbrauchsstichprobe (EVS) 1993; authors' calculations.
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Table 3: Life-insurance demand vs. children and wealth
observations LI holders
a
percent
Full sample 39612 23987 60.5
Number of children 0 21207 9833 46.4
1 7668 5683 74.1
2 7336 5792 78.9
3 2663 2098 78.8
4 585 462 79.0
5+ 153 119 77.8
Assets quintile 1 7922 3459 43.7
2 7922 4736 59.8
3 7922 5198 65.6
2 7922 5104 64.4
5 7924 5490 69.3
Source: Einkommens- und Verbrauchsstichprobe (EVS) 1993; authors' calculations.
a
Households with one or more life insurance policies.
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Table 4: Descriptive statistics for nancial variables
observations mean st.dev.
Gross income 39612 63250.7 44662.2
Net labor income 39612 46746.0 29675.3
Asset balance 39612 212059.2 325478.0
Face value of insurance policies
a
23987 62467.0 82534.1
Cash value of insurance policies
a
23987 29611.8 65546.4
Annual premium payments
a
23987 2243.7 3313.1
Source: Einkommens- und Verbrauchsstichprobe (EVS) 1993; authors' calculations.
a
Life-insurance holders only.
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Table 5: Face value of life-insurance policies vs. children and wealth
observations mean st.dev.
Full sample 23987 62467.0 82534.1
Number of children 0 9833 48516.4 66176.3
1 5683 66766.7 86897.3
2 5792 81508.0 95175.0
3 2098 92773.4 109985.7
4 462 88716.1 97586.1
5+ 119 80580.8 115787.1
Asset quintile 1 3459 37406.0 50427.5
2 4736 43288.3 52195.0
3 5198 64457.3 70215.7
2 5104 62597.5 67847.7
5 5490 104471.6 128670.8
Source: Einkommens- und Verbrauchsstichprobe (EVS) 1993; authors' calculations.
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Table 6: Probit regression of life insurance demand
All age groups Under 65 years only
estimate st. error p-value estimate st. error p-value
West Germany D -0.2264 0.0226 0.000 -0.1905 0.0243 0.000
Age 0.0901 0.0046 0.000 0.0803 0.0076 0.000
Age
2
-0.0010 0.0000 0.000 -0.0009 0.0000 0.000
Sex D 0.0444 0.0229 0.053 0.0568 0.0241 0.019
Married D 0.5980 0.0526 0.000 0.7034 0.0586 0.000
Number of children 0.0746 0.0108 0.000 0.0480 0.0113 0.000
Home owner D 0.0020 0.0225 0.929 0.0314 0.0267 0.239
Asset balance 0.0002 0.0000 0.000 0.0003 0.0000 0.000
Net labor income 0.0166 0.0018 0.000 0.0170 0.0018 0.000
Net labor income
2
-0.0000 0.0000 0.014 -0.0000 0.0000 0.012
Net labor income
3
5.43e-08 4.92e-08 0.270 5.42e-08 4.59e-08 0.238
Net labor income  married -0.0061 0.0010 0.001 -0.0073 0.0011 0.000
Average tax rate 1.4049 0.0993 0.000 1.2723 0.1031 0.000
Large income
a
D -0.0230 0.0285 0.420 -0.0429 0.0306 0.162
Self employed D 0.4373 0.0415 0.000 0.4304 0.0441 0.000
Civil servant D 0.0730 0.0256 0.004 0.0408 0.0261 0.119
Constant -2.4208 0.1096 0.000 -2.2708 0.1549 0.000
Number of observations 39612 32081
Log likelihood -21013.2 -18022.8
Pseudo R
2
0.2308 0.1221

2
(16) 5518.7 2915.7
Source: Einkommens- und Verbrauchsstichprobe (EVS) 1993; authors' calculations.
Notes : The dependent variable takes the value 1 if the household holds one or more life insurance policies,
and is 0 otherwise. Asset balance and net labor income are measured in units of DM 1000. Robust standard
errors.
a
The large income dummy variable takes the value 1 if gross income is in excess of DM 86.400, the 1993
maximum taxable earnings for the public pension system (Beitragsbemessungsgrenze).
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Table 7: OLS regression of life insurance face values
All age groups Under 65 years only
estimate st. error p-value estimate st. error p-value
West Germany D 15.7587 0.9827 0.000 16.7922 1.0596 0.000
Age -1.9689 0.2317 0.000 0.3675 0.3920 0.348
Age
2
0.0071 0.0023 0.003 -0.0213 0.0045 0.000
Sex D 0.1901 1.3442 0.888 1.1874 1.4120 0.400
Married D 4.4867 6.3041 0.477 7.1560 6.7743 0.291
Number of children 1.2776 0.6311 0.043 -0.4552 0.6794 0.503
Home owner D -5.7407 1.4911 0.000 -5.7367 1.6214 0.000
Asset balance 0.0394 0.0040 0.000 0.0422 0.0044 0.000
Net labor income 0.5515 0.1465 0.000 0.6162 0.1403 0.000
Net labor income
2
0.0030 0.0013 0.028 0.0028 0.0012 0.022
Net labor income
3
-6.20e-06 3.96e-06 0.118 -5.82e-06 3.70e-06 0.116
Net labor income  married -0.0810 0.1368 0.554 -0.1085 0.1453 0.455
Average tax rate -9.5066 6.5319 0.146 -14.5970 6.9217 0.035
Large income
a
D -1.5747 2.2563 0.485 -2.7115 2.3332 0.245
Self employed D 72.3754 3.4620 0.000 72.1611 3.5180 0.000
Civil servant D -10.3261 1.4855 0.000 -11.8301 1.5265 0.000
Constant 73.1455 6.4279 0.000 25.8394 8.6863 0.003
Number of observations 23929 22317
R
2
0.3389 0.3289
F(16,) 364.51 299.56
Source: Einkommens- und Verbrauchsstichprobe (EVS) 1993; authors' calculations.
Notes : The dependent variable is the sum of the face values of all life insurance policies held, excluding zero
observations. Face values, asset balance and net labor income are measured in units of DM 1000. Robust
standard errors.
a
The large income dummy variable takes the value 1 if gross income is in excess of DM 86.400, the 1993
maximum taxable earnings of the public pension system (Beitragsbemessungsgrenze).
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Table 8: Tobit regression of life insurance face values
All age groups Under 65 years only
estimate st. error p-value estimate st. error p-value
West Germany D 0.7927 1.1955 0.507 3.8146 1.2607 0.002
Age 3.8479 0.2365 0.000 4.0610 0.4069 0.000
Age
2
-0.0564 0.0024 0.000 -0.0597 0.0046 0.000
Sex D 2.3406 1.2468 0.060 3.0536 1.3000 0.019
Married D 35.1342 2.4347 0.000 40.1107 2.6125 0.000
Number of children 3.7845 0.5741 0.000 1.8641 0.6087 0.002
Home owner D -3.9929 1.2180 0.001 -2.5490 1.3017 0.050
Asset balance 0.0377 0.0018 0.000 0.0461 0.0019 0.000
Net labor income 1.2504 0.0651 0.000 1.3349 0.0682 0.000
Net labor income
2
0.0002 0.0005 0.649 7.58e-06 0.0005 0.989
Net labor income
3
-1.46e-06 1.38e-06 0.291 -1.12e-06 1.37e-06 0.412
Net labor income  married -0.4067 0.0457 0.000 -0.4601 0.0478 0.000
Average tax rate 57.3180 4.8800 0.000 50.1906 5.0188 0.000
Large income
a
D -4.0712 1.6958 0.016 -6.0068 1.7474 0.001
Self employed D 77.8294 2.0105 0.000 78.4872 2.0404 0.000
Civil servant D -4.9038 2.1182 0.021 -7.2022 2.0965 0.001
Constant -131.1412 5.5493 0.000 -140.1352 8.2622 0.000
 81.1408 0.4085 82.7119 0.4180
Number of observations 39612 32081
Log likelihood -133456.9 -130818.6
Pseudo R
2
0.062 0.039

2
(16) 17706.2 10879.3
Source: Einkommens- und Verbrauchsstichprobe (EVS) 1993; authors' calculations.
Notes : The dependent variable is the sum of the face values of all life insurance policies held, including zero
observations. Face values, asset balance and net labor income are measured in units of DM 1000.
a
The large income dummy variable takes the value 1 if gross income is in excess of DM 86.400, the 1993
maximum taxable earnings of the public pension system (Beitragsbemessungsgrenze).
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Figure 1: Total saving and insurance saving, 1960{96
Source: Deutsche Bundesbank, Gesamtwirtschaftliche Finanzierungsrechnung , various issues.
27
050
100
150
200
250
300
350
1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996
Total social security retirement payments
Total life insurance payments
Figure 2: Social security pensions and life insurance payments, 1980{96
Source: Gesamtverband der deutschen Versicherungswirtschaft (1997).
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Figure 3: Mean assets by age group
Source: Einkommens- und Verbrauchsstichprobe (EVS) 1993; authors' calculations.
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Figure 4: Mean and median net income by age group
Source: Einkommens- und Verbrauchsstichprobe (EVS) 1993; authors' calculations.
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Figure 5: Means and medians of annual life insurance premium payments by age group
Note: Life insurance holders only.
Source: Einkommens- und Verbrauchsstichprobe (EVS) 1993; authors' calculations.
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Figure 6: Median face and cash values of life insurance policies by age group
Note: Life insurance holders only.
Source: Einkommens- und Verbrauchsstichprobe (EVS) 1993; authors' calculations.
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